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The Adverse Economic Effects of Spectrum Set-Asides 
Robert W. Crandall and Allan T. Ingraham†
Abstract 
n February 2007, Industry Canada released a consultation that outlined a proposed auction design for spectrumI for Advanced Wireless Services. As part of its consultation, Industry Canada contemplated a spectrum set-aside
in the AWS auction to facilitate the entry of a new wireless service provider in Canada; however, it noted that a
potential drawback of a spectrum set-aside is that it can induce uneconomic entry into the market. In this paper,
we show that a set-aside for AWS spectrum in Canada is more likely to result in uneconomic entry than in a
viable domestic entrant into the Canadian wireless industry. Furthermore, if Industry Canada desires another
wireless service provider, there are far more constructive ways than a set-aside to promote viable entry into the
Canadian wireless industry.
encountered in set-aside auctions for spectrum. The U.S.Introduction 
C block auction was a set-aside auction for spectrum, the
consequences of which tied up valuable spectrum inn February 2007, Industry Canada released a consulta-
bankruptcy litigation for nearly a decade. As a result,I tion that outlines its auction design for spectrum for
network congestion reduced the quality of service thatAdvanced Wireless Services (AWS) in the 1.7 GHz and
carriers were able to offer in major metropolitan areas,2.1 GHz bands. 1 Industry Canada proposed to auction
forcing the wireless carriers to engage in costly cell-split-90 MHz of spectrum (45 MHz paired) in five separate
ting. Furthermore, the continued use of spectrum set-licence blocks. 2 The A and B blocks would each contain
asides in the United States has significantly distorted5 MHz of paired spectrum and would cover 172 licence
auction prices and has resulted in the costly creation ofareas. 3 The C and D blocks, which would each include
bidding fronts that incumbent carriers have used to cir-10 MHz paired, would each be divided into 59 geo-
cumvent set-aside rules.graphic licence areas. 4 Finally, the E block would contain
14 licence areas and have 15 MHz paired of spectrum.5 European auctions have also demonstrated thatThese blocks would be sold using a simultaneous multi- spectrum set-asides are inconsistent with the efficientround auction (SMR) design, which has been used in allocation of radio spectrum. For example, the auctionworldwide spectrum auctions for more than a decade. 6 for spectrum for universal mobile telecommunications
As part of its consultation, Industry Canada has con- service (UMTS) in the United Kingdom included a spec-
templated the value of a spectrum set-aside in the AWS trum set-aside for a new entrant. However, the United
auction to facilitate the entry of a new wireless service Kingdom placed no restrictions on the size or foreign
provider in Canada. 7 Industry Canada stated that ‘‘the ownership of that entrant. As a result, the set-aside
risk of having the spectrum bought by all the incum- merely served to subsidize Hutchinson, a large multi-
bents is that the opportunity of having further competi- national firm that would not require regulatory protec-
tive entry into the market would be prevented’’. 8 By tion to enable its entry into the U.K. market. Despite
contrast, Industry Canada noted that ‘‘not taking explicit receiving a £1.4 billion break on the price of the largest
action to enable entry may therefore have the conse- piece of bandwidth let at auction, Hutchinson, which
quence of preventing entry while taking explicit action began service under the company name ‘‘3’’ in 2003, has
runs the risk of potentially enabling uneconomic entry’’. 9 experienced significant difficulty in the U.K. market and
In this paper, we show that a set-aside for AWS spectrum is not projected to turn a profit until 2008. Therefore, the
in Canada will result in the uneconomic entry that spectrum set-aside in the U.K. UMTS auction not only
Industry Canada refers to, and that there are far more revealed that set-asides can encourage entry that is not
constructive ways than set-aside auctions to promote viable, but also revealed that set-asides can subsidize the
viable entry into the Canadian wireless industry. purchase of the most valuable asset let at auction by the
The implementation of the designated entity pro- firm that values that asset the least — an outcome that is
gram in the United States illustrates the many problems at odds with the maximization of consumer welfare.
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In addition to the examples in other countries that able spectrum to the wireless carriers that were best
illustrate the problems with set-aside auctions, there is a suited to deploy that spectrum.
more general reason why a set-aside for spectrum will In a subsequent auction for C block and F block
facilitate uneconomic entry in Canada’s AWS auction. licences that were either returned to the FCC or unsold
Canada’s foreign ownership restriction limits entry to in the original auctions for that spectrum, the FCC again
domestic firms only. However, the purpose of a spec- used a set-aside auction for designated entities. In this
trum auction is to allocate spectrum to the most efficient auction the FCC’s designated entity program induced
carrier — that is, the carrier that can use the spectrum to the creation of ‘‘bidding fronts’’, which were designated
provide the service most valued by the end user. Given ‘‘small’’ entities controlled by large wireless firms. As a
that a foreign entrant with experience in the provision of result, the set-aside program simply did not work in the
wireless services is more likely than a newly formed manner that the FCC had originally intended because
domestic entrant to be a viable wireless carrier, a spec- the FCC was unable to prevent valuable spectrum
trum set-aside for a domestic entrant risks allocating a licences from winding up in the hands of the economic
valuable public resource to the third-best entity. agents that valued them the most, namely, the large
Even though Canada’s foreign ownership restric- wireless companies. The overall effect of the set-aside
tions on wireless carriers are inefficient, a relaxation of program, however, was to increase greatly the transaction
these restrictions appears unnecessary to achieve a com- costs of wireless service providers and to delay the
petitive wireless industry. Market forces have recently led deployment of valuable spectrum assets, which increased
to some consolidation in the industry for wireless ser- the cost of wireless services and harmed the quality of
vices in Canada, but the industry’s performance since those services..
that time has provided no convincing evidence that the
industry is not competitive. 10 Therefore, it is far from A. The C Block PCS Spectrum apparent that Canada requires a fourth facilities-based
The FCC’s first C block auction was FCC Auction 5.wireless carrier, and the recent consolidation would indi-
That auction sold 30 MHz C block licences that werecate that the Canadian marketplace cannot support one.
disaggregated into 493 Basic Trading Areas (BTAs). TheThat said, if Industry Canada truly believes that another
auction began in December 1995 and ended inwireless service provider is necessary to effect competi-
May 1996 after 184 rounds of bidding. Net winning bidstion, it would be far more productive to encourage entry
in the auction exceeded $10 billion for 30 MHz of spec-through a relaxation of the foreign ownership restric-
trum, compared to the $7 billion raised in the A and Btions than through a spectrum set-aside. By allowing all
block auction (FCC Auction 4), which accounted forpotential entrants to compete with incumbent providers,
60 MHz of spectrum. The prices in the C block auctionCanada would know whether or not a fourth facilities-
were much higher than in the earlier A block and Bbased wireless carrier is viable.
block auctions, in part, because of the subsidies that were
granted to designated entities in this auction. 14 These
subsidies encouraged the designated entities to elevateI. The Effects of Set-Aside
their bids to artificially high levels that could not beAllocations for Broadband justified by subsequent market conditions. As a result,Spectrum in the United States many of the designated entities defaulted, inducing the
FCC to offer further subsidies in the form of generoushe Federal Communications Commission (FCC)
restructuring options so that they could retain the spec-T began to auction spectrum for mobile wireless ser-
trum that they won at auction. 15 Those options werevices in 1994 in response to a 1993 mandate from Con-
(1) disaggregation, (2) amnesty, and (3) prepayment.gress. The main frequency allocation to commercial
wireless carriers was the so-called PCS spectrum, which First, the FCC allowed any C block licensee to disag-
included five different chunks of bandwidth, or gregate 15 MHz of its spectrum for any particular licence
‘‘blocks’’. 11 Two of those blocks, the C block and the or group of licences and surrender that spectrum to the
F block, were originally sold as set-asides for small bid- FCC for re-auction. 16 For example, if a bidder won a
ders under the FCC’s ‘‘designated entity’’ program.12 30 MHz licence covering New York City and a 30 MHz
licence covering Boston, that bidder would have severalThe C block was first let at auction in 1996, 13 and
disaggregation options. It could choose to disaggregatewas the only block of spectrum up for bid in that auc-
one licence (either Boston or New York) from 30 MHztion. The end result of the C block auction was that a
into 15 MHz. Alternatively, it could choose to disaggre-number of the designated entities with winning bids
gate both licences from 30 MHz into 15 MHz licencescould finance neither these purchases nor the subse-
and pay to the FCC only one-half of its bid commit-quent costs of building out their networks. They subse-
ments from the auction.quently declared bankruptcy, and tied up valuable spec-
trum without using it while bankruptcy litigation Second, the FCC provided designated entities with
continued for nearly a decade. As a result, consumers the option of surrendering an entire C block licence in




































































The Adverse Economic Effects of Spectrum Set-Asides 133
applicable default payments. This amnesty option B. The Cost to Consumers from the
allowed designated entities to return the licence for the C Block Auction 
full amount of the winning bid, minus the initial down
The FCC’s designated entity program has had nopayment. 17
long-term benefits to the wireless industry in the UnitedThird, the FCC provided designated entities a pre- States. Despite the FCC’s efforts to effect competition inpayment option, which would allow them to prepay the the wireless industry through subsidized entry, the U.S.debt on a licence with the down payments of another wireless industry has evolved into a dynamically compet-
licence, thus granting the benefit of avoiding the pay- itive industry of large nationwide carriers. These carriers
ment of additional interest on the principal amount acquired nearly all of their spectrum either by competing
owed. Under the prepayment plan, a designated entity in auctions that were open to all bidders or through
could ‘‘apply 70 percent of the total of all down pay- secondary market transactions, which are negotiated at
ments it made on the licences that it elects to surrender market prices. Therefore, the FCC’s auction set-aside pro-
to the Commission (‘Available Down Payments’), to a gram was unable to positively contribute to consumer
prepayment of the Notes for as many of its licences as it welfare through the creation of sustainable wireless car-
wishes to keep’’. 18 riers that provide service to a significant portion of U.S.
subscribers.Despite its efforts to support winning bidders in the
first C block auction, the FCC’s efforts to sustain the Not only did the FCC’s spectrum set-asides notentry of these uneconomic designated entities were improve competition in the U.S. wireless industry and,
unsuccessful. NextWave, the bidder that won the largest therefore, not benefit U.S. consumers, but spectrum set-
share of licences in Auction 5, as measured in MHz- asides also imposed costs on the industry, which resulted
Pop19 of spectrum, declared bankruptcy in June 1998. in consumer harm. Because the FCC chose to initially
NextWave’s bankruptcy tied up substantial amounts of lease the rights to the C block and F block spectrum to
valuable C block spectrum in litigation for six years. The small bidders in small fragmented BTA licences, con-
FCC re-auctioned the NextWave spectrum as part of sumers were harmed by the delay that occurred in allo-
FCC Auction 35, which included both C and F block cating this spectrum to the bidder that valued it most.
spectrum licences. Bidding in Auction 35 concluded in Professor Thomas Hazlett of George Mason University
and Babette Boliek measured the rate of inefficiency ofJanuary 2001. In June 2001, however, before the FCC
the C block auction relative to the A and B block auc-delivered the licences to the carriers that had submitted
tions by the ratio of licences returned or resold in thosethe winning bids in the re-auction, the U.S. Court of
particular auctions. 27 The authors found that within aAppeals for the D.C. Circuit ruled that bankruptcy law
year of the first C block auction, 53 per cent of theprecluded the FCC’s re-auction of the spectrum, sending
493 licences let at auction had been returned to thethe spectrum back to NextWave, and the Supreme
FCC.28 By comparison, only twelve of the 102 licencesCourt subsequently upheld the D.C. Circuit’s decision. 20
sold in the A and B block PCS auction were resold
The spectrum that NextWave initially won in Auc- within one year after the auction ended.29 Consequently,
tion 5 in 1996 was finally sold in secondary market Hazlett and Boliek concluded that the allocation of the
transactions to Cingular Wireless and Verizon Wireless. A and B block spectrum was relatively more efficient
In August 2003, Cingular agreed to purchase than the allocation of the C block spectrum.
NextWave’s PCS licences covering 34 markets. 21 The
total price of the transaction was $1.4 billion, 22 which Hazlett and Boliek also calculated the social welfare
equated to a unit price of $1.69 per MHz-Pop. 23 In April costs of the delay in the deployment of the C block PCS
2005, Verizon and NextWave completed a $3 billion licences. 30 The authors concluded that by allocating
transaction for spectrum licences that covered 23 mar- spectrum to inefficient wireless carriers, the delay in the
kets, including Boston and New York City. 24 Verizon C block spectrum set-aside prevented the sale of that
paid $2.85 per MHz-Pop for the spectrum rights it pur- spectrum to a viable wireless carrier. 31 The authors
chased in that transaction. 25 Given that NextWave had found that the delay in the deployment of the C block
originally bid $1.49 per MHz-Pop for its spectrum, spectrum cost consumers $5.4 billion between 1996 and
NextWave’s investors realized a large return without 1998 and that each individual year of delay in the
ever offering a wireless service. Therefore, the FCC’s set- deployment of the C block spectrum cost consumers
aside program kept increasingly valuable spectrum $1.4 billion. 32 Therefore, by attempting to subsidize the
unused for up to a decade, but it did not promote entry entry of inefficient wireless carriers, the FCC neglected to
of new carriers. 26 As we show below, this delay in the allocate the spectrum in a timely fashion to the firm that
provision of spectrum to nationwide wireless carriers valued it the most, which resulted in significant con-
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front by Alaska Native was financially prudent, as AT&TC. The Emergence of Bidding Fronts in
would have paid $5.24 per MHz-Pop for the spectrum itSet-Aside Auctions 
won had it bid in the open segment of the auction,A secondary effect of the set-aside program used in whereas Alaska Native paid only $4.46 per MHz-Pop bythe United States was the emergence of bidding fronts bidding in the closed segment of the auction. 39and speculators. Bidding fronts are designated entities
Thus, by giving rise first to NextWave and then tothat are controlled by large wireless service providers.
Alaska Native, the FCC’s spectrum set-aside programThe two best examples of bidding fronts are Alaska
twice created unsustainable wireless carriers (AlaskaNative (a front used by AT&T) and Salmon PCS (a front
Native was designed to be unsustainable). 40 The FCC’sused by Cingular Wireless).
spectrum set-asides were ultimately unable to prevent
One must stress that these fronts were not illegal. large wireless service providers from leasing or
Rather, they emerged as a natural mechanism for large, purchasing spectrum allocated to designated entities.
incumbent wireless providers to circumvent the FCC’s However, the set-aside program simply delayed the sale
set-aside program and to control a designated entity, of that spectrum to the firms that eventually found use
even if the large carriers did not own a majority of the for it and thereby reduced the value of services available
bidding entity’s equity, thereby negating the FCC’s to consumers in the interim.
attempt to allocate a valuable economic resource in an
inefficient manner. Specifically, the FCC adopted a stan-
dard for a firm’s eligibility in the designated entity pro-
II. European Spectrum Auctionsgram that was based on both de facto and de jure con-
trol. Ownership of at least 50.1 per cent of an entity’s and New Wireless Entrants 
voting stock was evidence of de jure control. 33 De facto pectrum auctions in Europe also prove that set-asidescontrol was determined on a case-by-case basis and was S are not a productive way to encourage efficient entryrelated to a variety of factors such as management deci- into a wireless market. Specifically, the auction forsions and board seats. 34 Because the FCC’s standard was UMTS spectrum in the United Kingdom served only tounrelated to a large firm’s ability subsequently to effect subsidize Hutchinson, a large firm that would noteconomic control of any spectrum won at auction by the require a subsidy were it efficient for it to enter the U.K.bidding front, these large companies were able to use the wireless market. Furthermore, entrants throughoutclosed spectrum won at auction by the front without Europe have exhibited a high rate of failure. This factcausing the front company to pay ‘‘unjust enrichment leads one to believe that entry into the wireless marketspenalties’’ to the FCC.35 is often uneconomical, and that a spectrum set-aside
Both Alaska Native (AT&T) and Salmon PCS would only serve to attract entrants that are not viable.
(Cingular) were active bidding fronts in FCC Auction 35,
the re-auction of C block and F block spectrum that was A. The United Kingdom’s UMTStriggered by the bankruptcies that resulted from pro- Spectrum Auction viding bidding preferences in the original auctions.
The United Kingdom’s auction for UMTS spectrumThese auctions included the NextWave spectrum, which
began on March 6, 2000 and ended on April 27, 2000. 41was later sent back to NextWave as a result of the
The auction raised £22.5 billion, which amounted toSupreme Court’s ruling. However, Auction 35 also
$35.7 billion on the day that the auction was completed.included hundreds of spectrum licences unaffiliated
Five blocks of spectrum, each with nationwide coverage,with NextWave. 36 Of the 422 licences let at Auction 35,
were let at auction. The A block, which was spectrum170 of those licences were closed to large bidders. These
designated only for a new entrant, consisted of 15 MHz170 licences accounted for 1,707 million MHz-Pop. Of
of paired spectrum and 5 MHz unpaired. The B blockthese 170 licences, either AT&T or Cingular won 64 of
could be won by any bidder — entrant or incumbent —them, which accounted for 893 million MHz-Pop,
and consisted of 15 MHz of paired spectrum and nothrough their ‘‘designated entity’’ bidding fronts. There-
unpaired spectrum. Finally, the C, D, and E blocksfore, bidding fronts won 52.3 per cent of spectrum desig-
included 10 MHz of paired spectrum and 5 MHznated only for small bidders in FCC Auction 35.
unpaired. These blocks were open to any interested
Academic research on the effects of bidding on the bidder.
Auction 35 outcome reveals that those fronts had a sig-
nificant effect on prices paid for spectrum. Peter
1. The United Kingdom’s Set-Aside Led to anCramton, Allan Ingraham, and Hal Singer analyzed the
Inefficient Allocation of Spectrum effects of bidding fronts on prices in FCC Auction 35. 37
The authors found that bidding fronts significantly The A block sold for £4.4 billion to TIW, which
altered prices in both the closed and open segments of was a joint venture between Telesystem International
the auction; Alaska Native, by itself, inflated prices in the Wireless and Hutchinson Whampoa. 42 Hutchinson
closed segment of the auction by 58 per cent. 38 Further- Whampoa is a leading international telecommunica-




































































The Adverse Economic Effects of Spectrum Set-Asides 135
2000. 43 The B block sold for £5.9 billion. 44 The C, D, 2. TIW Is Struggling Despite Its Large Subsidy 
and E blocks, which were all nearly identical, all sold for
In addition to the cost of the spectrum, Hutchinsonbetween £4.0 billion and £4.1 billion to Orange,
built out its mobile network at a cost of £13 billion. 51One2One, and BT3G.45 The following table expresses
However, due to its late entry into the U.K. market —these bids in terms of pounds per MHz-Pop and pounds
Hutchinson first offered service under the brand nameper MHz-Pop of paired spectrum.
‘‘3’’ in 2003 — it is currently the smallest provider of
wireless service in the United Kingdom.52
Table of Prices per MHz-Pop for Paired Spectrum Because its late entry into the mobile marketplaceand All Spectrum in the U.K. UMTS Auction put 3 at a disadvantage relative to its competitors, 3 has
attempted to add subscribers and increase service reve-£ £/Paired
Block Winning Bidder (billion) £/MHz-Pop MHz-Pop nues by providing additional services such as mobile
A TIW (Hutchinson) 4.4 2.1 4.9 Internet access on both wireless handsets and laptop
computers. 53 Furthermore, there is good reason toB Vodafone 5.9 3.3 6.7
believe that the U.K. wireless market was competitiveC BT 4.0 2.7 6.7
even before 3 began to provide service. Were the marketD One2One 4.0 2.7 6.7
uncompetitive, then one would expect that 3’s entryE Orange 4.1 2.7 6.8
would result in significant price decreases for wireless
communications services. However, wireless voice pricesThe data in the above table show that the set-aside
declined significantly before 3 entered the market, andlicence for a new entrant afforded Hutchinson46 a price
decreases in voice prices after 3 entered were due todiscount for all spectrum and paired spectrum. Hutch-
regulated reductions in mobile termination charges. 54inson paid £2.1 per MHz-Pop for the 35 MHz of spec-
trum it won at auction, whereas Vodafone paid £3.3 per There is a substantial possibility that one of the
MHz-Pop for 30 MHz. For paired spectrum, Hutchinson other wireless service providers may acquire 3, which is
paid £4.9 per MHz-Pop for 15 MHz paired, while all not expected to become profitable until 2008 at the
other bidders at auction paid between £6.7 per MHz- earliest, eight years after it first acquired its spectrum
Pop and £6.8 per MHz-Pop. Therefore, the United licence. 55 Therefore, although regulators in the United
Kingdom’s set-aside to a new entrant simply subsidized Kingdom were successful in facilitating entry into the
the price of spectrum for a large international firm that wireless services market by allowing an entrant to obtain
arguably did not need a subsidy. spectrum in the UMTS auction at a lower price than
those paid by incumbents, the new entrant is currentlyThe size of Hutchinson’s subsidy serves as an esti-
struggling despite the fact that it is a large company withmate of the amount of the inefficiency caused by the set-
vast financial assets.aside in the U.K. auction. To determine the amount of
that subsidy, one must know the allocation and prices of
spectrum but for the set-aside. Such a calculation is B. Germany’s UMTS Spectrum Auction impossible to determine with perfect accuracy, but an
estimate of it can be determined as follows. Germany’s auction for UMTS spectrum began on
July 31, 200056 and ended on August 17, 2000. 57 ThatBecause Hutchinson bid in excess of £4 billion for auction included 12 spectrum blocks that were eachthe licence it won, it would have won a licence in an 5 MHz paired (120 MHz of spectrum in total). 58 Eligibleauction even without a set-aside. The marginal bidder in bidders were required to be active on at least two blocksthe open auction would have been NTL, which dropped of spectrum in any given round and were allowed to beout in round 150 when the price reached £4 billion for active on no more than three blocks of spectrum.59 Put10 MHz paired. 47 Therefore, the price of a C, D, or E simply, winning bidders were required by rule to win atblock (10 MHz paired) licence still would have been least 10 MHz paired, but could win no more than
£4 billion plus one bid increment, or £4.06 billion. 15 MHz paired. For this reason, at least four bidders were
Furthermore, Hutchinson valued a licence with 15 MHz guaranteed to win spectrum at auction. With four
of paired spectrum by approximately £700 million more incumbent providers at the time of the auction, and with
than a licence with only 10 MHz paired. 48 Adding one no spectrum set-aside for a new entrant, the auction
bid increment to £4.7 billion yields a price for the A and rules did not guarantee that a new entrant would be
B licences of £4.83 billion — a price that Vodafone and born from the auction.
BT likely would have been willing to pay for the spec-
trum.49 Consequently, an estimate of the size of Hutch- Winning bidders included four incumbent wireless
inson’s subsidy, and an estimate of the size of the ineffi- carriers and two new entrants. The two new entrants
ciency of the United Kingdom’s set-aside, is £4.83 billion were MobilCom and Group 3G.60 The entrants were not




































































136 Canadian Journal of Law and Technology
reseller of wireless service in Germany that had financial A similar situation occurred in the Swiss UMTS
backing from France Telecom,61 and Group3G was a auction that took place in 2000. In that auction, four
consortium of Sonera and Telefonica. Telefonica is a spectrum licences of equal size (15 MHz paired and
leading worldwide telecommunication provider with 5 MHz unpaired) were awarded. 72 Because there were
revenues of €31 billion in 2001. 62 Sonera, a leading pro- only three incumbents, the auction effectively guaran-
vider of telecommunications services in Finland, had net teed at least one new entrant. However, that entrantincome equal to €284 million in 2001. 63 Therefore,
would receive identical spectrum to any other winningalthough Germany introduced two new wireless prov-
bidders. Furthermore, that entrant would, by design, payiders to its market through its sale of 3G spectrum
the same price as other bidders at auction. 73licences, those two new entrants were large companies
with telecommunications expertise in other countries, The three incumbent providers, Swisscom, Orange,
and they were not provided with subsidized entry by the and dSpeed, each won a licence. 74 The other licence wasauction.
awarded to Team3G, which was a division of
Despite the financial strength of the parent compa- Telefonica. 75 Telefonica, however, never built out the
nies of the wireless entrants in the German market, both network necessary to deploy the spectrum it won at
MobilCom and Group 3G experienced difficulty soon auction. As a result, the licence was rescinded in
after entry. Investors criticized bidders for bidding so April 2006. 76 Therefore, auctions for spectrum in Austriaaggressively for the spectrum and stated that the German
and Switzerland both serve as examples that newmarket could not support six 3G service providers. 64
entrants into wireless markets are often prone to failure.Ultimately, Sonera and Telefonica abandoned their joint
venture, Group 3G,65 as both companies wrote off the These auctions should not be viewed by policy-
debt they incurred by bidding in the 3G Auction in makers as providing a justification for precluding new
Germany and attempting to deploy the spectrum after entrants from establishing wireless service in already
the auction. 66 Ultimately, Group 3G returned its spec- competitive markets. However, they should serve as atrum won at auction back to the German government. 67
warning to regulators that subsidizing or attempting toSoon after Group 3G’s demise, MobilCom returned its
facilitate entry into the wireless industry runs the risk ofspectrum won at auction to the German regulator68 as
allocating spectrum in an inefficient manner. As a result,France Telecom and MobilCom reached agreements
the spectrum would go unused by the firm most quali-with one of MobilCom’s creditors, Nokia, on a restruc-
turing of MobilCom’s loans. 69 Hence, the German fied to deploy it.
UMTS auction also serves as an example of the inability
of regulators to induce new entry into a wireless industry
that is already competitive.
III. An Analysis of the AWS
Spectrum Auction Reveals That
C. Other UMTS Spectrum Auctions a Set-Aside for a Domestic
Several other European countries have seen new Entrant Is Unnecessary 
service providers enter their wireless markets by first
 spectrum set-aside for a domestic entrant wouldwinning spectrum at auction. As in the United Kingdom A likely result in an inefficient allocation of the AWSand Germany, however, those entrants have been large
companies that provide telecommunications services in spectrum. The Canadian wireless market, which is
other countries. Furthermore, some of these entrants already competitive, has shown that it is unable to sup-
have proven unsuccessful and have exited the industry, port four domestic carriers under current ownership
while other entrants have, thus far, proven to be viable. rules. Were Industry Canada to decide that some form of
The successful entrants, however, did not require a spec- market intervention is required, removing the foreign
trum set-aside or other subsidies to enter the market ownership restriction and rejecting a spectrum set-asidesuccessfully.
for any entrant would be a far more productive way to
For example, 3G Mobile, a unit of Spain’s Telefonica encourage entry into the Canadian wireless market. Spe-
SA, and Hutchinson 3G, a unit of Hong Kong’s Hutch- cifically, such an auction would first determine whether
inson Whampoa Ltd., were both new entrants that won or not entry is viable, and second, regardless of whether
licences in the Austrian spectrum auction that took place or not entry occurs, the auction would be more likely toin November 2000. 70 3G Mobile proved unsuccessful
result in an efficient allocation of spectrum. Furthermore,and exited the Austrian market in late 2003, selling its
the AWS spectrum is new bandwidth that will need tospectrum licences to T-Mobile, an incumbent service
be built out by all winning bidders. An incumbent wire-provider in Austria. 71 Hutchinson 3G, however, deployed
less carrier would not have a substantial cost-basedthe spectrum it won at auction and is continuing to




































































The Adverse Economic Effects of Spectrum Set-Asides 137
trum allocation — either the entrant would fail andA. A Set-Aside for a Domestic Entrant
return the spectrum for re-auction or it would sell theWould Result in an Inefficient
spectrum to a competitor — costs would be imposed onAllocation of Valuable Spectrum 
consumers by delaying the consumption of the servicesAs stated above, Industry Canada has acknowledged
provided through that spectrum. Therefore, consumersthat a spectrum set-aside runs the risk of subsidizing
would benefit if the auction results in an efficient spec-entry of inefficient carriers. However, Industry Canada
trum allocation ab initio and avoids the need for thedoes not acknowledge that because of Canada’s restric-
efficient allocation to be determined years hence on thetion on foreign entry into the Canadian wireless
secondary market.industry, a spectrum set-aside would likely amount to an
allocation of spectrum to the third-best carrier. Specifi- Furthermore, we note that the first-best outcome
cally, for a spectrum allocation to a new domestic can only be achieved without a set-aside for any new
entrant to be efficient, that domestic firm must value the entrant. That is, even if the foreign ownership restriction
spectrum more, at the margin, than both the incumbent is lifted, Industry Canada might be tempted to provide a
wireless carriers and a foreign entrant. For this reason, set-aside for a new entrant, regardless of whether that
and regardless of whether foreign ownership restrictions entrant is domestic or foreign. Although such an auction
are lifted, it makes more sense for Canada to use an would be more efficient than one that only allowed
efficient and open auction to (1) determine if entry is domestic entrants to compete for a spectrum set-aside, it
viable, and (2) allocate spectrum to the best-suited would still run the risk of allocating spectrum to an
entrant if competitive bidding reveals that an entrant is entrant when that spectrum would be most efficiently
justified. used by an existing incumbent. Simply put, a spectrum
set-aside for any entrant would potentially allocate spec-
trum in a second-best manner.1. A Domestic Entrant Is Viable Only if That
Entrant Values the Spectrum More Than a Although there is no convincing evidence that theForeign Entrant with Expertise in Wireless Canadian wireless market is not competitive, if IndustryServices Canada is truly interested in determining whether or not
Any new entrant will be viable only if that entrant is a fourth facilities-based wireless firm is viable, the best
able to provide a service that is valued sufficiently by the environment in which to determine this viability would
market so as to allow the entrant to cover its recurring be one that eliminated the foreign ownership restriction
costs. 77 The value of spectrum is determined by the net and allowed all wireless carriers to compete on equal
present value of the services that can be provided terms at auction. Such an auction would increase the
through the use of that spectrum. A viable entrant would likelihood that an efficient allocation of spectrum would
need to value the first blocks of spectrum purchased at a occur, since all interested parties would be allowed to
higher rate than incumbent wireless carriers in Canada. express, through competitive bidding, their values for the
Although it is conceivable that a domestic entrant fitting spectrum. By comparison, a spectrum set-aside for a new
this criterion already exists, it is more likely that such an entrant would greatly increase the likelihood of an ineffi-
entrant would be a firm already equipped with expertise cient allocation of a valuable public resource — an
in the provision of wireless communications services. action that is adverse to the welfare of Canadian con-
Therefore, a necessary (but not sufficient) 78 condition for sumers. Put differently, it is not apparent that any market
a domestic entrant to be viable is that the entrant must intervention is necessary, but if Industry Canada seeks to
either (1) provide a wireless service to Canadian con- determine the value of a fourth facilities-based wireless
sumers that is more valuable than one provided by a service provider, it should conduct a fair market-based
foreign entrant, or (2) provide a service of similar value to test of the viability of such a provider rather than force
consumers as the foreign entrant but at a lower cost. For the entrance of an inefficient provider that is very likely
this reason, a spectrum set-aside for a domestic entrant to fail.
risks allocating the spectrum in a ‘‘third-best’’ manner.
B. Because the AWS Spectrum Is New2. A Removal of the Foreign Ownership Bandwidth, All Winning Bidders WillRestriction Would Be Economically Superior to
Incur Large Build-Out Costs after thea Spectrum Set-Aside for a Domestic Entrant
Auction Were Industry Canada To Decide That
Intervention Is Required As stated above, the value of spectrum is determined
by the net present value of profits that can be achievedBecause it is not apparent that there exists a
through the services provided on that spectrum. Becausedomestic entrant that values the AWS spectrum more
the costs of network equipment necessary to build outthan both a foreign entrant and/or domestic incum-
the spectrum are large, those build-out costs directlybents, a set-aside for a domestic entrant would likely
influence the price that a carrier is willing to pay for theresult in a third-best allocation of spectrum. Although
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quently, an incumbent carrier is willing to pay a pre- the provision of PCS spectrum to the marketplace, and
mium for spectrum that it can easily patch into it resulted in the creation of bidding fronts that both dis-
existing network. By contrast, an incumbent carrier will torted auction prices and were costly to create. Further-
discount its willingness to pay for new spectrum which more, the spectrum set-aside in the United Kingdom
must be built out with new network equipment, by the merely provided a subsidy to a large multi-national firm
price of that equipment. 79 that (1) did not need the subsidy to begin with, and (2) is
teetering on the brink of failure even after havingThe majority of spectrum used to provide commer-
received that subsidy. Finally, other spectrum auctions incial wireless services is Canada’s PCS spectrum, which is
Europe have shown that subsidies are not required forin the 1.9 GHz band. Because the AWS spectrum is
entry to be successful, so long as all potential entrants arelocated in a different band, new wireless equipment will
allowed to bid.be required to deploy that spectrum. Furthermore, new
handsets that operate on both the AWS band and the Although there is no evidence that the wirelessPCS band will be needed. Therefore, incumbent bidders industry in Canada is less than competitive, Industrywill be unable to integrate this new spectrum into their
Canada should still reject a spectrum set-aside for aexisting wireless operations without incurring significant
domestic entrant if it wants to determine whether alevels of investment. As a result, incumbent carriers’
fourth wireless carrier is indeed needed. Specifically, abuild-out costs after the auction will be similar to the
set-aside for a domestic entrant would amount to abuild-out costs of a large entrant. For this reason, it
determination on the part of Industry Canada that (1) amakes little sense to subsidize a new entrant since that
new entrant is needed to increase competition, and thatentrant is at no cost disadvantage relative to the incum-
(2) the most efficient entrant resides within Canada.bent in deploying the spectrum.
Instead, Industry Canada could use an auction without a
spectrum set-aside to test for the viability of a new facili-
ties-based entrant. That is, if competition and innovationConclusion in the Canadian wireless industry are truly lacking, a
new entrant would emerge from an auction for spectrum set-aside for a domestic entrant in
bandwidth that must be built out by any winningA Canada’s forthcoming auction for Advanced Wire-
bidder (either entrant or incumbent). Therefore, Industryless Services spectrum in the 2 GHz band would likely
Canada should reject a spectrum set-aside, which could,result in an inefficient allocation of a valuable public
with reasonable likelihood, force the allocation of spec-resource. Industry Canada should carefully reflect upon
trum to an inferior carrier and reduce the economicthe disastrous outcome of the FCC’s set-aside auctions.
welfare of end-users.Those auctions resulted in nearly a decade-long delay in
Notes:
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